I also distinguish between this objection and various traditional charges of circularity, regress, relativism, or psychologistic reductionism. I argue, however, that despite this the constructivist cannot escape my version of the objection. Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge Philosophy of Science Cambridge Core Coherence, Truth, and the Development of Scientific Knowledge - Volume 74 Issue 1 Online purchasing will be unavailable between 08:00-12:00 GMT on Sunday 12th February 2023 due to essential maintenance work. I grant that the constructivist need not be a coherentist about truth. Drawing on the work of Ralph Walker and Crispin Wright, I argue, however, that it faces a distinct objection that is a descendent of Bertrand Russell’s Bishop Stubbs objection against coherentist theories of truth. Such a position does see off most of the above initial worries. I will argue that responding to these initial worries pushes ambitious metanormative constructivism towards adopting a kind of position that I will call “constructivism all the way down”. Natural ways of pursuing the project of ambitious metanormative constructivism lead to certain obvious, and related, worries about whether the ambitions are really being achieved-that is whether we really are being given a distinctive theory. Ambitious metanormative constructivism is the project of either developing a type of new metanormative theory, worthy of the label “constructivism”, that is distinct from the existing types of metaethical, or metanormative, theories already on the table-various realisms, non-cognitivisms, error-theories and so on-or showing that the questions that lead to these existing types of theories are somehow fundamentally confused. We can distinguish between ambitious metanormative constructivism and a variety of other constructivist projects in ethics and metaethics.
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